Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2004

Dan Leatham, Robert E. Steele, Tim Slocum,
Harold W. Johnson, and W. Fred Hurst v. Utah
Department of Corrections, and The Career
Service Review Board of the State of Utah : Reply
Brief
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Phillip W. Dyer; Carey A. Seager; Law Offices of Phillip Dyer; Attorneys for Appellants.
Robert E. Steed; Brent A. Burnett; Assistant Attorney General; Attorneys for Respondent.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Leatham v. Utah Department of Corrections, No. 20040376 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2004).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/4971

This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

UTAH
DOCUMENT
KFU
SO
.A10
DOCKET NO. OoO<HQ'$=H0

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
DAN LEATHAM, ROBERT E. STEELE )
TIM SLOCUM, HAROLD W. JOHNSON )
and W. FRED HURST
)

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS/
PETITIONERS

Appe1iant s/Pet itloners, )
vs.

)

UTAH DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS and THE CAREER
SERVICE REVIEW BOARD of the
State of Utah,

)
)
)
)

Respondents/Agencies.

Case No. 20040376

)

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS/PETITIONERS DAN LEATHAM, ROBERT
STEELE, TIM SLOCUM, HAROLD W. JOHNSON AND W. FRED HURST

APPEAL FROM THE UTAH CAREER SERVICE REVIEW BOARD

ROBERT E. STEED, ESQ.
BRENT A. BURNETT, ESQ.
Assistant Attorney General
160 East 300 South, 5th Fir.
P.O. Box 140857
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0857
Attorney for Respondent/Agency
CAREER SERVICE REVIEW BOARD
ATTN: Robert H. Thompson,
A dm inistrator
1120 State Office Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
ResDcndent/Aaencv

PHILLIP W. DYER, ESQ
CAREY A. 3EAGSR, ESQ.
LAW OFFICES OF PHILLIP DYER
221 Kearns Building
136 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorneys for Appellants/
Petitioners Dan Leatham,
Robert E. Steele, Tim
Slocum, Harold W. Johnson
and W. Fred Hurst
FILED
UTAH APPELLATE COUR"

APR - 7 2005

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
DAN LEATHAM, ROBERT E. STEELE
TIM SLOCUM, HAROLD W. JOHNSON
and W. FRED HURST

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS/
PETITIONERS

Appellants/Petitioners,
vs
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS and THE CAREER
SERVICE REVIEW BOARD of the
State of Utah,

Case No. 20040376

Respondents/Agencies.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS/PETITIONERS DAN LEATHAM, ROBERT E
STEELE, TIM SLOCUM, HAROLD W. JOHNSON AND W. FRED HURST

APPEAL FROM THE UTAH CAREER SERVICE REVIEW BOARD

ROBERT E. STEED, ESQ.
BRENT A. BURNETT, ESQ.
Assistant Attorney General
160 East 300 South, 5th Fir.
P.O. Box 140857
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0857
Attorney for Respondent/Agency
CAREER SERVICE REVIEW BOARD
ATTN: Robert N. Thompson,
Administrator
1120 State Office Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Respondent/Agency

PHILLIP W. DYER, ESQ
CAREY A. SEAGER, ESQ.
LAW OFFICES OF PHILLIP DYER
221 Kearns Building
136 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorneys for Appellants/
Petitioners Dan Leatham,
Robert E. Steele, Tim
Slocum, Harold W. Johnson
and W. Fred Hurst

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES.

11

ARGUMENT.
I.

RESPONDENTS' ASSERTION THAT PETITIONERS
MUST MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE IS INCORRECT
BECAUSE PETITIONERS HAVE NOT CHALLENGED
THE FINDINGS OF FACT BUT HAVE CHALLENGED
THE LEGAL SUFFICIENCY OF ITS CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW BASED ON THE ABSENCE OF FINDINGS
OF FACT BY THE CAREER SERVICE REVIEW BOARD
IN THIS MATTER. THUS, RESPONDENT'S
MARSHALING ARGUMENT IS INAPPLICABLE TO THE
ISSUES BEFORE THE COURT

II.

THE CSRB'S INTERPRETATION OF ITS EXCUSABLE
NEGLECT RULE SHOULD BE REVERSED BECAUSE
THE CSRB INCORRECTLY INTERPRETS THE
REPRISAL PROHIBITION CONTAINED IN
U.C.A 67-19A-303(3) (1991)

3

THE TWENTY (20) DAY STATUTE OF
LIMITATIONS WAS TOLLED BY THE EQUITABLE
DISCOVERY RULE

7

II.

A.

B.

The Concealment Prong of the
Equitable Discovery Rule Operates
to Toll the Statute of Limitations

7

The Exceptional Circumstances Prong
of the Equitable Discovery Rule
Operates to Toll the Twenty (20)
Day Statute of Limitations

11

CONCLUSION.

13
i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES

Page

Anderson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.,
92 0 P. 2d 575 (Utah Ct. App. 1996)
Berenda v. Langford, 914 P.2d 45, 51 (Utah 1996)
Davis County Solid Waste Management v. City
of Bountiful, 52 P.3d 1174, 1176 (Utah 2002)
Holland v. Career Service Review Board,
856 P. 2d 67 8, 681 (Utah Ct.App. 1993)

9
8, 9

6
3, 5

Russell Packard Development, Inc. v. Carson,
520 Utah Adv. Rep. 15 (Utah, March 1, 2005)...7, 8, 9, 11
Sevy v. Security Title Co. of Southern Utah,
902 P. 2d 629, 636 (Utah 1995)

12

Wardley Better Homes and Gardens v. Cannon,
61 P.3d 1009, 1014 (Utah 2002)
Warren v. Provo City Corp., 838 P.2d 1125 (Utah 1992)...

3
9

Worrall v. Ogden City Fire Dep't,
616 P.2d 598, 600-602 (Utah 1980)

10

CONSTITUTIONS
STATUTES
Utah Code Annotated § 67-19A-303(3)(1991)

3, 4

Utah Code Annotated § 67-19a-401 (5) (a) (i-ii) (1999)...5, 7
Utah Code Annotated § 78-12-26(3)
RULES
ii

7

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

DAN LEATHAM, ROBERT E. STEELE )
TIM SLOCUM, HAROLD W. JOHNSON )
and W. FRED HURST

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS/
PETITIONERS

Appellants/Petitioners,
vs .
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS and THE CAREER
SERVICE REVIEW BOARD of the
State of Utah,
Respondents/Agencies.

>

Case No. 20040376

]
;
;

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS/PETITIONERS DAN LEATHAM, ROBERT E.
STEELE, TIM SLOCUM, HAROLD W. JOHNSON AND W. FRED HURST

APPEAL FROM THE UTAH CAREER SERVICE REVIEW BOARD

Appellants/Petitioners Dan Leatham, Robert E. Steele,
Tim Slocum, Harold W. Johnson and W. Fred Hurst

(herein

"Petitioners") submit this Reply Brief for consideration by
the Court.
ARGUMENT
I
RESPONDENTS' ASSERTION THAT PETITIONERS MUST MARSHAL
THE EVIDENCE IS INCORRECT BECAUSE PETITIONERS HAVE
NOT CHALLENGED THE FINDINGS OF FACT BUT HAVE
CHALLENGED THE LEGAL SUFFICIENCY OF ITS CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW BASED ON THE ABSENCE OF FINDINGS OF FACT BY
THE CAREER SERVICE REVIEW BOARD IN THIS MATTER.

THUS, RESPONDENT'S MARSHALING ARGUMENT IS
INAPPLICABLE TO THE ISSUES BEFORE THE COURT
In Argument I of Respondents' Brief, Respondents argue
that Petitioners' Appellate Brief is premised on a challenge
to the findings of fact issued by the Step 5 Hearing Officer
(herein

xx

the Hearing Officer") and the Career Service Review

Board (herein "the CSRB").

Respondents' argument is,

however, non-responsive to Petitioner's arguments on appeal
because Petitioners have not challenged any of the findings
of fact made below.

Rather, Petitioners have argued that

the Hearing Officer and the CSRB failed to make any explicit
findings of fact that Petitioners had excusable neglect, or
alleged lack there of, incident to the filing of their
grievance.

While the Step 5 Hearing Officer did make a

conclusion of law, he did not make any finding of fact on
this issue.1

Moreover, the CSRB did not make any

independent finding of fact on this issue but erroneously
affirmed the "nonexistent finding of fact" of the Hearing

1. In spite of Respondents using four (4) pages of its
Brief to recite, verbatim, the Hearing Officer's Findings of
Fact, Respondents do not direct this Court to any of the
findings in support of their position that a factual finding
was made on the excusable neglect issue.
2

Officer on this issue.

(R.369, 499, 515). 2

Petitioners therefore respectfully submit that they are
not required to marshal evidence to support a nonexistent
finding of fact and Respondents' marshaling argument is
inapplicable and should not be well-taken.3
II
THE CSRB'S INTERPRETATION OF ITS EXCUSABLE NEGLECT
RULE SHOULD BE REVERSED BECAUSE THE CSRB
INCORRECTLY INTERPRETS THE REPRISAL PROHIBITION
CONTAINED IN U.C.A 67-19a-303(3) (1991)
Petitioners and Respondents disagree on the standard of
review to be applied by this Court concerning the CSRB's
decision that excusable neglect can never, as a Inatter of
law, be predicated on an employee's objective fear of
retaliation/reprisal by management.

Petitioners

respectfully submit that Respondents' argument for an
intermediate standard of review, under Holland v. Career

2. Contrary to Respondents' assertion, Petitioners are not
required to marshal the evidence because Petitioners are not
challenging the CSRB's findings of fact but rather its
conclusions of law. See, Wardley Better Homes and Gardens
v. Cannon, 61 P.3d 1009, 1014 (Utah 2002) (challenges to a
trial court's legal determinations do not require marshaling
the evidence).
3.

Id.

3

Service Review Board, 856 P.2d 678, 681 (Utah Ct.App. 1993)
would be appropriate in any circumstance that did not
necessary implicate a separate statutory prohibition enacted
by the Legislature.

Thus, for example, an employee who

might become seriously ill for an extended time period such
that his/her time period for filing a grievance might lapse
while he/she is on sick leave would fall within the scope of
the CSRB's rule on excusable neglect.
The circumstance in the case before the Court, however,
necessary implicates a second provision in the organic
statute governing the CSRB, namely, U.C.A. 67-19a303(3)(1991), which prohibits reprisals by management, to"wit:
>x

(3) No person may take any reprisals against
any career service employee for use of
grievance procedures specified in this
chapter."
Thus, it is the CSRB's interpretation of the excusable
neglect statute, in connection with the reprisal prohibition
provision, that creates an initial legal issue regarding the
standard of review in this matter.4

4.

Petitioners

Thus, Petitioners assert the Court must harmonize the
4

respectfully submit that this Court is in as good a position
to interpret both of the foregoing statutes as is the CSRB.
Accordingly,, Petitioners submit that the correction of error
standard should be applied in this case with no deference
being given to the CSRB's legal conclusion regarding whether
Petitioners' objective fear of retaliation would constitute,
as a matter of law, excusable neglect under the CSRB's
organic statute. Thus, Petitioners would submit that
Petitioners are entitled to the relief sought in their
Appellate Brief without any deference being
accorded/afforded to the CSRB's decision in this matter.
Even, arguendo, if this Court were to apply an
intermediate standard of review to the CSRB's Decision on
this issue, Petitioners respectfully submit that the CSRB's
Decision is neither reasonable nor rational because it fails

excusable neglect provision created in U.C.A. 67-19a401(5) (a)(i-ii)(1999) with the reprisal provision quoted in
the text. While the excusable neglect provision includes a
legislative grant of rulemaking authority to the CSRB that
would suggest an intermediate standard of review under
Holland, the reprisal statute does not contain such
authority thereby suggesting a correction of error standard.
Petitioners submit this presents a question of first
impression not heretofore addressed in the context of an
appeal from any decision concerning the CSRB.
5

to properly harmonize the reprisal statute as set forth
hereinabove.5

Inasmuch as the CSRB is required, as a

principal of statutory interpretation, to harmonize its
statutes, Davis County Solid Waste Management v. City of
Bountiful, 52 P.3d 1174, 1176, 510 (Utah 2002)(principles of
statutory interpretation require the provisions to be
harmonized

NX

in accordance with legislative intent so as to

give meaning to each provision"), Petitioners respectfully
submit that the CSRB's Decision fails to appropriately
harmonize its organic statute in light of the Legislature's
intention to preclude an objective fear of
retaliation/reprisals against merit employees.

5. The CSRB's Decision held that it is only "actual
reprisals" (as opposed to objective fear of reprisal) that
invokes the CSRB's statutory authority. Petitioners'
Appellate Brief, at pages 18-19, specifically analyzes the
fundamental flaw in the CSRB's analysis, to-wit: The CSRB
does not have statutory authority to adjudicate grievances
based on actual reprisals and the CSRB cannot realistically
enforce the statutory mandate unless objective fear of
retaliations/reprisals is/are included within the definition
of excusable neglect. Significantly, Respondents' Brief
fails to address Petitioners' argument on this issue.
Petitioners submit Respondents' omission of any argument is
because no compelling or persuasive argument can be
presented in opposition thereto.

6

Ill
THE TWENTY (20) DAY STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
WAS TOLLED BY THE EQUITABLE DISCOVERY RULE
A.
The Concealment Prong of the Equitable Discovery Rule
Operates to Toll the Statute of Limitations
In the recent decision of Russell Packard Development,
Inc. v. Carson, 520 Utah Adv. Rep. 15 (Utah, March 1,
2005), 6 the Utah Supreme Court clarified the test for the
concealment prong of the equitable discovery rule as
follows:

6. In Russell Packard, the Utah Supreme Court distinguished
between a "statutory discovery rule" (where the statute
itself mandates application of the discovery rule) and an
"equitable discovery rule" (where the statute does not
include a discovery rule mandate) and concluded that the
discovery rule operates differently under each situation.
In Petitioners' Initial Brief, which was filed prior to the
Russell Packard decision, Petitioners argued that the
"excusable neglect" provision contained in U.C.A. 67-19a401(5)(1999), acted as a tolling mechanism but did not argue
the same constitutes a "discovery" statute. In light of the
Utah Supreme Court's analysis in the Russell Packard
decision, Petitioners do not believe that the "excusable
neglect" provision constitutes a "statutory discovery rule"
comparable to the one discussed in Russell Packard (i.e.,
U.C.A. §78-12-26(3) that provides a cause of action will not
accrue "until the discovery by the aggrieved party of the
facts constituting the fraud malice."). See, Russell
Packard at 5121. Thus, Petitioners submit that, in the case
at bar, the twenty (20) day statute of limitations does not
contain a "statutory discovery rule" and is therefore
subject to the concealment and exceptional circumstances
prongs of the equitable discovery rule.
7

"First, a plaintiff may successfully toll a
statute of limitations by showing that, given
the defendant's concealment of the plaintiff's
cause of action, the plaintiff neither
discovered nor reasonably should have
discovered the facts underlying the cause of
action before the limitations period expired.
Once a plaintiff makes this showing, the
concealment version of the discovery rule will
operate to toll the relevant statute of
limitations, and the limitations period will
not commence unti 1 the date the plaint iff
possessed actual or constructive knowl edge of
the facts forming the basis of his or her cause
of action. Russell Packard, 520 Utah Adv. Rep
15, 5129 (Utah 2005) . ;
7. Respondents' Brief cites to Berenda v. Langford, 914
P.2d 45, 51 (Utah 1996), are misplaced. Berenda, does not
apply to the case at bar for three reasons: first, Berenda
involves tolling where there is a statutory discovery rule,
whereas the case at bar involves an equitable discovery
rule; second, the quotation from Berenda in Respondents'
Brief was not the Utah Supreme Court's holding but the
Defendant's argument, that the Utah Supreme Court rejected,
to wit:
"However, under our case law the rule is otherwise
when a plaintiff alleges that a defendant 'took
affirmative steps to conceal the plaintiff's cause
of action, as is the case here. In such a
situation, the plaintiff can avoid the full
operation of the discovery rule by making a prima
facie showing of fraudulent concealment and then
demonstrating that given the defendant's actions, a
reasonable plaintiff would not have discovered the
claim earlier." Berenda at 51-52.
And third, the Utah Supreme Court in Russell Packard,
further clarified that:

8

The Utah Supreme Court explained that the concealment
prong of the discovery rule balances the following policy
considerations:
"[T]he discovery rule balances (1) the policy
underlying all statutes of limitations " T to
promote justice by preventing surprises through
the revival of claims that have been allowed to
slumber until evidence has been lost, memories
have faded, and witnesses have disappeared,! "
914 P.2d at 52 (quoting Myers, 635 P.2d at 86
(further citation omitted)), with (2) the policy
of "not allowing a defendant who has concealed
his wrongdoing to profit from his concealment,"
id. (citing Bailey v. Glover, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.)
342, 349, 22 L.Ed. 636 (1874) (further citation
omitted))." Id. at 528.
"[I]nquiry notice operates differently "when a
plaintiff alleges that a defendant took
affirmative steps to conceal the plaintiff's
cause of action." Berenda,
914 P.2d at 51. When
a plaintiff has made a prima facie showing of
fraudulent concealment, a plaintiff will be
charged with constructive notice of the facts
forming the basis of a cause of action only at
that point at which a plaintiff, reasonably on
notice to inquire into a defendant's wrongdoing,
would have, with due diligence, discovered the
facts forming the basis for the cause of action
despite the defendant's efforts to conceal it.
See id. at 51-52." Russell Packard Development,
Inc. at 138.
Respondents' reliance on Warren v. Provo City Corp., 838
P.2d 1125 (Utah 1992) and Anderson v. Dean Witter Reynolds,
Inc., 920 P.2d 575 (Utah Ct.App. 1996) for the same
proposition is thus likewise misplaced.

9

January of 1998 was the first time Petitioners had
actual knowledge8 that they were entitled to on-call time
compensation encompassed within their grievance.

It is

undisputed that prior to July of 1997, Petitioners were
subject to a coercive regime of administrations who mislead
Petitioners about their entitlement to on-call compensation
(R.373), who also directed them not to file time-sheets that
included on-call time (R.373-374, 514), and who even
threatened to terminate the employment of the Department's
Administrative Law Judge when he filled out time cards with
on-call time (R.366). In light of Respondents' misleading
conduct, Petitioners' conduct in filing their grievance in
January of 1998 is reasonable and the applicable statute of
limitations was tolled.

As noted by Justice Durrant in

8. Respondents argue that there was sufficient facts to put
Petitioners on notice on two grounds. First, the rule
dealing with on-call compensation was available; and,
second, Petitioners received on-call pay for Officer in
Charge (herein "OIC") time after July of 1997. In response
to the Respondents' first claim of notice, the Utah Supreme
Court has previously held that administrative rules (in and
of themselves) do not constitute notice. See, Worrall v.
Ogden City Fire Dep't, 616 P.2d 598, 600-602 (Utah 1980).
Regarding the OIC on-call time, Petitioners submit they
sought on-call compensation for non-OIC on-call ~ime and,
hence, OIC on-call time does not constitute any relevant
notice.

10

Russell Packard:
"If we were to look only to whether a
plaintiff theoretically could have brought a
suit before the limitations period expired
without looking to the relative reasonableness
or unreasonableness of that action under the
circumstances, we would reward a defendant's
fraudulent and deceptive misbehavior by
depriving an innocent plaintiff of a
reasonable period within which to act. This
we refuse to do. MT]o permit one practicing
a fraud and then concealing it to plead the
statute of limitations whem, in fact, the
injured party did not know of and couild not
with reasonable diligence have discovered the
fraud' would be xnot only subversive of good
morals, but also contrary to the plainest
principles of justice.' 51 Am. Jur. 2d
Limitations
of Actions
§183 (2004)."
Russell
Packard Development, Inc. at 528.
B.
The Exceptional Circumstances Prong of the Equitable
Discovery Rule Operates to Toll the Twenty (20) Day Statute
of Limitations.
The exceptional circumstances prong of the equitable
discovery rule involves a balancing test:
XNN

The ultimate determination of whether a case
presents exceptional circumstances that render
the application of a statute of limitations
irrational or unjust' is a balancing test. Id.
The balancing test weighs the hardship imposed
on the claimant by the application of the
statute of limitations against any prejudice
to the defendant resulting from the passage of
time. Myers, 635 P.2d at 87. Some factors
this court considers in applying this test
include whether the defendant's problems
11

caused by the passage of time are greater than
the plaintiff!s, whether the defendant
performed a technical service that the
plaintiff cannot reasonably have been expected
to evaluate, and whether the claim has aged to
the point that witnesses cannot be located,
evidence cannot be found, and the parties
cannot remember basic events. See Klinger, 7 91
P.2d at 872; Myers, 635 P.2d at 87." Sevy v.
Security Title Co. of Southern Utah, 902 P.2d
629, 636 (Utah 1995) .
In weighing the hardship on Petitioners (by imposing
the twenty (20) day statute of limitation) against the
prejudice, if any, as the Respondents, Petitioners submit
the scales weigh heavily in favor of the Petitioners.

The

Respondents created the circumstances that prevented
Petitioners from being paid for on-call time worked and
further directed Petitioners not to file time sheets with
on-call time through July of 1997.

It is only after July of

1997 that Petitioners were directed to file time sheets with
limited on-call time for OIC on-call time.

Again, had

Respondents wanted to protect themselves from potential
grievances, all they had to do was pay the Petitioners as
required by law.

If Petitioners are limited to recovering

only the compensation for the twenty (20) working days prior
to the filing of their grievance in January of 1998,
Respondent's use of fear and intimidation will be sustained.

12

This Court should not condone such misconduct and should
reverse the CSRB's Decision.
CONCLUSION
Petitioners respectfully request that this Court
reverse the CSRB's Decision and order the Respondents to
rightfully award Petitioners' on-call compensation in a
fashion consistent with their "made whole'' request contained
in their grievance.
DATED th is

? f-

day of

, 2005

Respectfully submitted,

>hillip W. Dyer, Esq,
Carey A. Seager, Esq.
Attorneys for Petitioners
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